Relevant For:
- Regulators and policy-makers wrestling with bank resolution and governance design
- Corporate lawyers advising financial institutions on fiduciary duty and insolvency risk
- Academics and graduate students studying financial regulation, corporate law, or systemic risk
Remarkable Points:
- Frames shareholder empowerment as a structural counterforce to prudential safety
- Maps legal rules to incentive channels that generate collective risk-taking
- Compares corporate law defaults with regulatory remedies and exposes their tensions
- Highlights how disclosure, takeovers, and insolvency rules interact with bank fragility
Most Liked (As-Is Statements):
- Corporate law does not just fail to deter systemic risk; in many cases it amplifies it
- Regulatory fixes that ignore corporate law incentives are fragile by design
Key Themes:
Theme 1: Incentive Architecture
Kokkinis treats law as a force that shapes payoffs. The book converts abstract duties and rules into predictable behavioral responses by managers and shareholders.
Theme 2: Regulatory-Corporate Law Friction
The core insight is friction: prudential tools and corporate defaults pull in opposite directions. That tension explains why regulation alone often underdelivers.
Theme 3: Legal Channels of Systemic Risk
Takeovers, disclosure regimes, insolvency rules and executive pay are not trivia; they are conduits through which private incentives externalize risk onto the system.
Theme 4: Comparative and Instrumental Thinking
Beyond description, the book uses comparative law to ask which legal designs reduce harmful incentives and which simply relocate risk.
Final Remark:
The book's value lies in turning a policy debate into a toolbox of mental models. Kokkinis forces readers to treat corporate law as policy levers rather than background noise. The analysis is disciplined and selective: it aims to change how you diagnose regulatory failures rather than to catalog them. Practical prescriptions follow logically from the structural diagnosis, though some solutions remain institutionally hard.
The right legal rules change what actors want to do; this book shows how to read those preferences and design against collective ruin.
Similar Books:
- The Bankers' New Clothes by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig
- Regulating Wall Street by Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson
- Banking on the Future by Howard Davies and David Green